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Slavery in International Law: OfHuman Exploitation and Trafficking. By Jean
Allain. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013. Pp. xi, 428. Price: $220.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Joseph Saei.
Jean Allain's work is primarily a chronological exposition of the legal
norms and formulations that first justified and then eventually criminalized sla-
very, from Aristotle to modem day conventions. Allain's ambition is to lead
social scientists and legal practitioners out of a "definitional quagmire" and into
a "shared understanding" of what he believes to be the ultimate definition of
slavery, from article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention: "the status or condi-
tion of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised" (pp. 109, 112). Whether and to what extent he suc-
ceeds will not be entirely clear to readers unfamiliar with the pre-existing litera-
ture on slavery and international law, but signs of defeat surface toward the end
of the work. The most argumentative and therefore fascinating portion of Al-
lain's book is its penultimate chapter, in which he applies the hoary legal doc-
trine he tries to modernize in the earlier chapters to a modem-day situation: the
civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002).
Before arriving at the case of Sierra Leone, the work draws particular at-
tention to a legacy of legal and doctrinal incertitude left by slavery on modem
international courts and codifying-bodies. These bodies have struggled to mar-
shal the doctrine to prosecute the full spectrum of coerced labor and servitude
present in modem societies. The Brima case of the Special Tribunals in Sierra
Leone is therefore a key data point that provides Allain with a concrete exam-
ple of how one court wrangled with international slavery law. In this situation,
the factual context is the phenomenon of "bush marriages," a type of forced la-
bor and sexual violence perpetrated against kidnapped women in the conditions
of civil war.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was formed in 2002 to consider,
among other things, the crime against humanity of enslavement, and in 2007
the Trial Chamber heard the Brima case, in which it convicted three leaders of
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, one of several factions active during
the war (p. 289). The phenomenon of "bush wives" or "rebel wives" is a un-
iversally condemned practice in which soldiers capture women and-under the
threat of extreme violence-subject them to rape and compel them to perform
household and other field duties, sometimes including participation in live
combat. In the Brima Case the Appeals Chamber disagreed with the Special
Trial Chamber over how such "bush marriages" ought to be characterized. Al-
lain claims that the disagreement between the trial and appellate courts is indic-
ative of a broader conflicted understanding in international law when it comes
to applying the legal doctrine of slavery.
At issue is why the Trial and Appellate Chambers in the Brima case di-
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vided over whether to categorize the "bush wife" phenomenon under the head-
ing of sexual slavery (an "outrage against human dignity" and so a war crime)
or the heading of forced marriage (an "inhumane act" and so a crime against
humanity) (pp. 303-04) (citing the language employed by the tribunals). The
trial court decided to classify forced marriage as a type of sexual slavery, in ef-
fect putting the phenomenon into the war crimes category. The Appeals Cham-
ber then reversed, opting to classify forced marriage separately as a crime
against humanity (p. 304).
Having explained this procedural history, Allain begins an attack on the
Appeals Chamber, agreeing with the trial court that forced marriage should be
categorized as slavery. Allain relies on a bizarre assertion that the Appeals
Chamber was somehow sanctioning the bush marriages as legitimate marriages
by its disposition of the case. However, this reasoning elides a crucial distinc-
tion; the court was not trying to rule on whether "bush marriages" count as sla-
very writ large, but whether they constituted a type of sexual slavery, a much
narrower category with its own distinct features, and a war crime. It seems that
Allain unfairly attacks the court for not determining a broader academic ques-
tion that it was never tasked with deciding. His acknowledgement that the mis-
take may have originated with the prosecution's failure to make their accusa-
tion of slavery a separate count further undermines his broad reading of the
court's decision as forever foreclosing the possibility of understanding forced
marriage as sexual slavery.
Allain believes that the relevant challenge faced by the court was to apply
old slavery doctrine (according to his understanding, rooted in the 1926 defini-
tion) to novel iterations of human oppression, which mix the old forms to create
new species of atrocity. This understanding of what the court sought to accom-
plish errs by implicitly favoring reification and codification of doctrine over
evolution and flexibility of application. Allain wishes to anchor the modem de-
finition in the old doctrine and "provide a foundation not only for legal cases to
move forward, but for a shared understanding of slavery across the social
sciences[,]" a reference point "much needed within the context of the study of
contemporary slavery." (p. 109). Allain never explains why it is necessary or
even desirable to synchronize social science with (a presumptively valid) legal
formalism in the face of variegated and shifting types of oppression. He fre-
quently merges legal and social-science questions without indicating that the
two types of inquiry have distinct aims. Allain hints at the positive practical ef-
fects of his preferred definition but never states outright what these might be.
One is left asking what, from the perspective of a victim, is the practical value
of a unified definition.
The court's real struggle to categorize a new kind of atrocity was in fact a
fascinating exploration of the boundaries and possible overlap of slavery and
other forms of forced labor. To his credit, Allain does set out these boundaries
early in the book, but he brushes them to the side in the case study. What makes
bush wife status a form of servitude distinct from those previously considered
is that it is a class of servitudes attached to a particular gender. These servitudes
have the added complexity of using socially sanctioned forms of labor division
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to achieve greater legitimacy and social sanction. Allain mentions this tension
in passing, but his analysis is strained by an incongruous and vague defense of
the institution of marriage, which he believes to be under attack in the Appeals
Chambers.
Allain impugns the motives of the court without explaining to readers
why such suspicions are justified. This space would have been better spent ex-
ploring the more interesting question of why the court opted for one categoriza-
tion when other options were available. Allain argues:
Protection should have been afforded to the victims of such "forced marriages"
through the disavowing of the language of the perpetrators, in recognizing that the
crime was in no way conjugal association or a marriage in the sense of a unit
which is fundamental to building a family and, by extension, to a society worth liv-
ing in (p. 308).
This reaction to the Appeal Chamber's ruling is confusing on multiple le-
vels. First, it erroneously suggests that the court's distinction between forced
marriage and sexual slavery amounts to sanctioning forced marriage by equat-
ing it with the broader concept of marriage. It seems more likely that the perpe-
trators would have simply said "wife" or "marriage." The adjective "forced," as
employed by the court, serves as an adequate indicator of the coerced and vio-
lent nature of the relation. Second, Allain implies that the Appellate Chamber
foreclosed the possibility of forced marriage ever rising to the level of slavery.
However, the court could have elected to find multiple convictions under the
same facts, but it simply opted not to rule on that issue. Opting not to rule on
one crime because of prosecutorial fumbling is distinct from issuing a decision
that forecloses that crime arising under similar facts ever again.
An alternate view that Allain never explores is that the Appeals Chamber
chose to distinguish forced marriage from sexual slavery for compelling rea-
sons. If, for example, the court had agreed with Allain and found that forced
marriage was a kind of sexual slavery and thus a war crime, then the precedent
might have applied narrowly to situations of war and conflict. The court's
choice to characterize forced marriage as a human rights violation may have
been an attempt to broaden the scope of application of the holding. Allain could
have expounded a number of interesting alternate theories, but he eschews a
more nuanced discussion in favor of a bizarre tirade against the court and in de-
fense of the institution of marriage: "the Special Court for Sierra Leone has . . .
done a disservice to the institution of marriage by labeling what transpired dur-
ing the Civil War in Sierra Leone as forced marriage" (p. 307). Again, Allain
assumes without apparent justification the worst of the appellate court. It would
be more interesting to think about whether, and to what extent, marriages may
be legally indexed as "forced" outside the context of a war zone, and whether
the "institution of marriage" is not also used to create effective situations of
slavery even in times of relative peace.
Another problem with Allain's analysis is that the markers "slavery" or
"sexual slavery" alone do not capture the complexity of the relation between
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the soldiers and the captured women. His critique treats the court's choice of
words as a distortion of what marriage is normally like. Allain remarks: "A
second justification for rejecting the nomenclature of "marriage" in "forced
marriage" is that there exists an international legal obligation, under Article 23
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to protect the fami-
ly, of which the entry point is deemed marriage" (p. 307).
Allain does not explain why the special tribunals in Sierra Leone would
have been concerned with the civil right of marriage or with protecting the pos-
itive right to marry, when the question with which they were presented in the
Brima case was rather how to condemn, in the strongest terms possible, an op-
pressive practice which was described by the oppressors as marriage in order to
feign legitimacy. One is left wondering why, rather than attacking the court for
finding a new crime against humanity called "forced marriage," Allain did not
congratulate the court for understanding that the term marriage is frequently
used to sanction slavery-like practices in both war and peace. Contrary to Al-
lain's claim, it is more likely that the new crime of "forced marriage" will give
courts increased flexibility in determining when a crime has been committed.
The slavery threshold is not foreclosed, but it is not deemed necessary for the
crime of forced marriage. This means that there is a new crime with broader
application that does not require the stricter scrutiny of slavery, traditionally
defined, but which may nevertheless reach that level as well. Allain's analysis
fails to contemplate the argument that the court's characterization of the crime
as "forced marriage" is a more nuanced and realistic one that captures the
unique power dynamics and psychological manipulations particular to this of-
fense.
Allain's treatment of the Brima case is difficult to follow and it is full of
contradictions. The most glaring contradiction is his defense of the institution
of marriage in the context of a discussion of the legal doctrine that criminalizes
slavery. This doctrine, as Allain repeats throughout his book, is based on a sta-
ble definition of slavery as the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person. It is difficult to understand why Allain
neglects to acknowledge that even "legitimate" marriages are used in other con-
texts to effect a kind of permissible forced and sexual labor and why he does
not think there is a tension between the institution of marriage and slavery doc-
trine. For example, the phrase "marital rape" is a contradiction in terms in
many societies. We might ask why law regarding consent to marriage tends to
focus on a discrete act of consent at the beginning of a relation but does not
conceptualize consent as an ongoing phenomenon. Is a marriage initially con-
sented to capable of evolving into a forced marriage? Finally, we could explore
whether the international law of slavery, forced labor, and lesser servitudes is a
primarily male-driven doctrine that fails to adequately address gendered forms
of servitude and labor.
War and War Crimes: The Military, Legitimacy and Success in Armed Conflict.
By James Gow. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013. Pp.
vii, 211. Price: $37.50 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Ben Picozzi.
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In contemporary conflicts, neither the international tribunals that apply
principles of international criminal law nor the public that sends troops to war
actually participate in warfare.' This is significant, James Gow argues, because
the military's ethical beliefs differ fundamentally from the beliefs of those who
judge its members and do not share their wartime experience. Their disregard
for its beliefs erodes the military's confidence in those who legitimate their
conduct.
Gow's War and War Crimes attempts to correct this by giving voice to
the concerns of military officers who struggle with moral and professional di-
lemmas in the conduct of their duties. To accomplish this, Gow conducts inter-
views with senior military practitioners and presents their responses alongside
the theory and history of international criminal law. He concludes that "[n]o
issue of criminality relating to the conduct of military operations can, or should,
be understood without reference to the specifics of the context in which an
event occurred" and that "[t]he judgement [sic] of military professionals . .. is
the appropriate way to determine the point at which issues of criminality should
be assessed" (p. 140). Gow's argument, however, suffers from his failure to
connect theory and history to practice. This is evident not only in his failure to
apply this theory and history to contemporary examples, but also in his failure
to apply them in his discussion of the interviewees' responses.
Gow's argument is strongest when its connection to his interviewees is
greatest. Chapters Four and Five report the participants' responses to general
and specific questions concerning the contradictions between justice and strate-
gy. Generally, participants were highly sensitive to war crimes accusations.
Rightness of action, they argued, depends on the military context (pp. 77-80).
Actions impermissible in one context may be permissible in others. Although
participants did not agree on the appropriate course of conduct in some hard
cases, for example, whether issues of force protection might require the killing
of prisoners of war, they agreed that the moral rules of necessity and proportio-
nality are affected by strategic concerns (pp. 94-98).
However, participants argued that the non-military public did not share
this belief. They expressed dissatisfaction with the failure of the public to un-
derstand the difficulties of wartime decisionmaking and its contextualist ethics.
As one participant argued, "[t]he societies who send people to war have no idea
what war is about. They want to apply their ethics" (p. 73). Similar concerns
arose with respect to war crimes prosecutions, which often do not apprehend
military considerations. Instead, they argued, their conduct should be judged by
fellow professionals. Judgment requires experience, and only those with that
experience can reliably evaluate this conduct given its contexts (pp. 83-84).2
1. See Allison Danner & Erik Voeten, Who Is Running the International Criminal Justice
System?, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 35, 54-55 (Deborah D. Avant et al. eds., 2010). No Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) judges were career military professionals prior to election. Id.
2. Gow does not disclose the participants' biographical information, but claims that the par-
ticipants represented roughly all areas of all continents, and that their responses did not vary significant-
ly by nationality (pp. 19-20). Notwithstanding this, the reported responses appear to represent institu-
tions with high levels of organization and professionalism and formal procedures for prosecuting war
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Unfortunately, the remaining chapters are less interesting. Gow's argu-
ment weakens as he strays into the theoretical. Chapter Two introduces the
Multidimensional Trinity Cubed Plus, on which Gow heavily relies. The con-
cept, inelegantly abbreviated as the Trinity3(+), describes the political environ-
ment in which modem wars are waged. The legitimacy of modem wars, Gow
argues, depends not only on the trinitarian relationship between the govern-
ment, military, and people in the warring party, but also similar relationships
between groups in the opposing party and third parties (p. 37). Military profes-
sionals must manage their relationships to all other groups in this environment
to legitimate their conduct.
Gow's description of the political environment is potentially powerful be-
cause it suggests the difficulty of this task. However, he rarely applies the con-
cept to specific situations and, consequently, misses opportunities to strengthen
his argument. For example, Gow invokes the concept to discuss problems of
legitimacy that arise when military and non-military groups disagree, but does
not consider disagreements between multiple non-military groups. Yet, the lat-
ter are potentially more interesting in terms of the dilemmas that they create for
military practitioners. In the United States, for example, war-making powers
are often divided among political actors.3 Disagreements between these actors
were manifest in partisan disputes over the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. Af-
ter the 2006 elections, a Democrat-controlled Congress challenged the Bush
Administration by holding hearings on Iraq and American foreign policy gen-
erally.4 The Obama Administration has since faced similar challenges, includ-
ing challenges to the military's treatment of enemy combatants. How would
military practitioners respond when a war-opposing legislature attempts to
oversee the conduct of a military commanded by a war-supporting executive?
Would this change if the public overwhelmingly favored one side? Gow does
not address these or similar questions.
Similarly, Gow does not consider problems that arise when groups in the
warring party disagree with their counterparts in third parties about their mili-
tary's conduct-for example, when the military's conduct is domestically
popular but internationally unpopular. Again, the Iraq conflict is exemplary. In
crimes. Specifically, the United Kingdom, the United States, and former Yugoslavian republics appear
disproportionately represented. Further research disaggregating responses by institution could reveal
how national and organizational factors influence military personnel's' attitudes. Indeed, there are good
reasons to believe these dependencies might exist. In countries with weak civilian control, militaries are
shielded from civilian oversight. Hence, civilian inquiries into the ethics of their wartime conduct may
not arise. See, e.g., Aurel Croissant et al., Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian
Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 950, 962 (2010) ("[W]eak
civilian control will ... undermine . . . institutional checks-and-balances .... [M]ilitary dominance over
decision-making areas shields those policy matters from civilian oversight. That is, even if there are au-
tonomous civilian agencies these cannot function as institutional counterweights in those areas which
are exclusively dominated by the military.").
3. James M. Lindsay, The Shifting Pendulum of Power: Executive-Legislative Relations on
American Foreign Policy, in DOMESTIC SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 223, 225-26 (James
M. McCormick ed., 6th ed. 2012).
4. James M. McCormick, Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy,




coalition countries, large majorities believed that their militaries tried very hard
to avoid civilian casualties.6 However, these opinions were not shared globally.
By contrast, most Muslim countries believed that the coalition forces' conduct
was inadequate.7 Similar differences existed with respect to whether Iraqis
were better off as a result of the intervention.! How do military practitioners
measure legitimacy and legality under these circumstances? Although accoun-
tability to both domestic and international societies may be important, military
practitioners may feel more beholden to the former.
Gow also occasionally loses his argument in the Trinity 3(+)'s abstract-
ness. In an especially troublesome passage, Gow refers to the Trinity (+)'s
"honeycombed triangles and multiple three-dimensional diamond rhomboids"
(p. 134). Although such passages are not outright misleading, they do nothing
to further his argument, suggesting that the concept's utility is not worth the
layer of indirection it creates. Gow's argument would be easier to follow if he
described these relationships between parties in concrete, historical terms.
The greatest failing of the Trinity3 (+), however, is that it is irrelevant for
much of the book. Gow does not discuss the concept with participants and rare-
ly references it in his analysis of their responses. When he does, it does not
provide any insight that could not be provided by reference to a simpler con-
cept, such as "context,"without the difficulties that the neologism creates. For
example, Gow writes that "the conceptualization involved in strategy, transmit-
ted to operations and tactical action, is all about context, that is, it is always part
of the Trinity3 (+)" (p. 89). But this reference to the Trinity 3(+) is unnecessary,
since "context" already supplies its meaning.
Another failing of the book is that Gow's historical analysis of war
crimes is poorly integrated. Chapter Three describes the development of the
laws of war and the tribunals established to enforce them. Gow's analysis,
however, is burdened by his discussion of these bodies' procedural details.
Gow does not return to these details in his analysis of the participants' res-
ponses. Chapter Six describes several weaknesses with tribunals based on the
participants' responses, but does so ahistorically. Are these weaknesses inhe-
rent to the tribunals' institutional structure or a product of the evolution of war
crimes? Or do they merely arise from the peculiarities of the individual partici-
pants' situations? If the tribunals' interaction with the military is problematic,
Gow does not make the nature of the problem explicit.
This is a missed opportunity; Gow's historical account of war crimes
could have been a rich source of analysis. His history suggests that the modem
absolutist morality defining war crimes, which conflicts with military practi-
tioners' preferred contextualist morality, might have arisen in response to twen-
tieth-century experiences with genocide and other crimes against humanity.
Gow acknowledges the modem blurring of humanitarian law with an absolutist
human rights law (p. 130). However, his own history suggests that the trend
6. PEW RESEARCH CTR., VIEWS OF A CHANGING WORLD 24-25 (2003).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 25-26.
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towards absolutism occurred much earlier and, as a result, the conflict may be
more fundamental and, hence, difficult to solve.9 If this is true, then better inte-
grating military practitioners into the existing tribunal framework may not be
sufficient. It may be necessary to rethink the moral and legal assumptions that
underlie that framework.
Despite these shortcomings, War and War Crimes presents a compelling
account of military concerns with the war crimes regime. The importance of
understanding these concerns extends beyond their relevance for legal institu-
tions. Such concerns are representative of the larger cultural gap that exists be-
tween military and non-military communities. Although reconciliation on a
single issue or set of issues will not close the gap, it is nevertheless necessary
for maintaining a healthy civil-military relationship, upon which military effec-
tiveness and national security depend.' 0
Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-
Conflict. By Eric D. Patterson. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2012. Pp. ix, 206. Price: $55.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Steven Levy
& Britta Redwood.
In his musings on human nature and the stabilization of (re)conquered ter-
ritories Niccol6 Machiavelli wrote that "men should either be caressed or
crushed; because they can avenge slight injuries, but not those at are very se-
vere. Hence, any injury done to a man must be such that there is no need to fear
his revenge."' 1 Essentially, Machiavelli advocated for two mutually exclusive
post-bellurn policies designed only to ensure Order-act with utter mercy or
practice total subjugation-and warned that the middle path was a road to ruin.
Throughout Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contempo-
rary Post-Conflict Eric D. Patterson explicates a Machiavellian (in the literal
rather than the pejorative sense of the word) post-war model that, in its prag-
matic, amoral, and regime-agnostic approach, bears important similarities to its
progenitor. Although Patterson does not cite Machiavelli, both their models
prioritize Order above all else and recognize that wounding the conquered
without permanently crippling them is a recipe for disorder. Moreover, aside
from Patterson's contention that Order should be pursued because it is a moral
good in and of itself, both models are explicitly amoral. But it is crucial to note
that although Patterson cloaks his arguments in amorality, he is proposing poli-
9. Gow argues that "Nuremburg began a blurring of boundaries that has continued to mark
the realm of international criminal law" (p. 52). However, this blurring refers to the blurring of state and
individual responsibility.
10. Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn argue that "at present the gap between the military and
society in values, attitudes, opinions, and perspectives presents no compelling need to act to avert an
immediate emergency. However, there are problems that, if unaddressed, will undermine civil-military
cooperation and hamper military effectiveness. The result might well harm the national security of the
United States." Peter D. Feaver, Richard H. Kohn & Lindsay P. Cohn, The Gap Between the Military
and Civilian in the United States in Perspective, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIvIL-MILITARY GAP
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 1, 11 (Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001).
I1. NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 9 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1532).
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cy recommendations to intervening parties (e.g., the West) that invariably claim
to have moral justifications and motivations for their interventions. Patterson's
writing style is characterized by accessibility, momentum, and brevity. He
seeks to appeal to a wide audience, stating in his conclusion that the book will
be a success if it proves equally useful to "a lieutenant in Kandahar, an aid
worker in South Sudan, a diplomat in Sri Lanka, and a student at Oxford" (p.
178). By avoiding discipline-specific jargon, enlisting intelligible primary
sources, and remaining concise, he has certainly accomplished this goal. Patter-
son's work reads like a manual-short chapters punctuated by signposts that
signal to the reader what prong of his framework is being explored, and by
what means. This is no small feat given how nuanced and example-rich his ar-
guments are.
Patterson is inspired by what he calls "the defining conflict of our time:"
the Iraq War (p. 1). The complexity of the conflict-which raises issues of
preemption, terrorism, humanitarian intervention, multilateral involvement, and
the obligations of post-war reconstruction-makes it an archetype for the host
of complicated, protracted conflicts that the United States and other Western
countries have led or participated in over the course of the last quarter century.
The Iraq War is not only typical in the questions that it raises, but also typical
of a certain kind of failure. Patterson's book seeks not to set out a systematic
critique of these failures, but to provide a framework for thinking about what
kinds of actions policymakers, aid workers, and military leaders need to take in
order to ensure that wars end well.
Patterson's framework is threefold. The first priority in any post-conflict
situation, he argues, is ensuring Order. Order is identified by Patterson as a
moral good and an end in itself, as Order is the necessary basis for the flourish-
ing of a number of other social goods. Justice is closely related to Order be-
cause a feeling of deep injustice may eventually upset Order, even if this occurs
many years later. The Treaty of Versailles is one of history's most poignant ex-
amples of this idea. Even if the Allied Powers were justified in punishing Ger-
many's belligerence to the extent that they did, their severe terms left Germany
humiliated and hungry for vengence. Germany-the paradigmatic case of Ma-
chiavelli's man dealt an injury strong enough to enrage him yet too weak to
permanently cripple him-therefore moved to upset the post-war Order as soon
as it could. Once Order has been established and steps toward Justice have been
made (even if rather limited ones), Conciliation may occur. Patterson acknowl-
edges that Conciliation is a rare occurrence, and may happen only many years
after the conflict has formally ended. Conciliation is, however, the ultimate sign
of a war ending well. Patterson portrays the concepts of Order, Justice and
Conciliation as a diagram in the form of a pyramid of which Order is the base,
Justice, resting on Order, is the middle level, and Conciliation, a rare and defin-
itive sign of success, is the crowning peak (p. 162).
Throughout the book Patterson uses historical examples to illustrate his
thesis; at certain points, however, Patterson is guilty of massaging facts to suit
his ideas. For instance, during his discussion of Conciliation he states, "Recon-
struction ended in 1876 as a result of political compromise" (p. 105). First of
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all, this "political compromise" occurred in 1877 rather than 1876.12 More sig-
nificantly, however, framing this event as a "political compromise," and there-
by suggesting that it was a duly considered, formalized agreement between
Democrats and Republicans, is misleading. This "political compromise" was in
fact an informal, unwritten, backroom scheme engineered by a few actors in
each party that furtively traded the freedom of southern blacks for Democratic
acceptance of a Republican president.' 3
Patterson also cuts corners to suit the thesis when he argues that "the
West still mistakenly thinks economic development is the root of Order when,
in truth, it is the fruit of stability and security" (pp. 177-78). In reality, Order
and economic development are locked in a reciprocal interrelationship in which
economic development bolsters Order and vice versa. This distortion of bidi-
rectional relationships also manifests itself in related parts of his analysis, such
as his contention that "we fail to recognize that often what we think are the
seeds of peace and security (access to water, sanitation, education) are actually
thefruits of peace and security" (p. 10). Once again Patterson seems oblivious
to the fact that these factors interact as either a vicious or virtuous cycle where-
by the decline or ascent of one produces the decline or ascent of the other. This
apparent nescience is particularly jarring given Patterson's grasp of the similar
reinforcing dynamic that exists between Order and Justice. It is conceivable
that Patterson is making these claims neither out of ignorance nor to cut cor-
ners, but to bring his position in sharper contrast with the neoconservative arc-
hitects of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the foremost proponents of the no-
tion that economic development produces Order. Whatever his motivation, his
misrepresentation or flattening of the facts do more to distract than they do to
bring his ideas into sharper relief.
Even setting aside certain oversights in the facts that Patterson makes,
some aspects of Patterson's central thesis concerning the dialectic between Or-
der and Justice are deficient. In Patterson's view, "sweeping efforts at Justice
can be imprudent or even destabilizing, but in those cases where some Justice is
possible, it can help found and sustain a deeper, richer peace" (p. 72). Thus,
while Order must precede Justice, Order often depends in many ways on the
feeling that Justice has been or is being done. The argument that Order and Jus-
tice are reliant on one another is intuitive-if one party to a conflict feels that
they have been wronged, the ensuing peace may be only transient. In order to
ensure that Justice does not come to threaten Order, Patterson cautions against
fulfilling what may be the full demands of Justice. Justice should be a perfor-
mance, the procedural and even substantive requirements of which remain
loose.
These are valuable insights but Patterson concludes his analysis prema-
turely: he merely identifies some amount of Justice as a possible prerequisite
for ending wars well without offering any guidance on whose Justice should
12. C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE
END OF RECONSTRUCTION 3-4 (3d ed. 1967).
13. Id. at 3-21.
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prevail. This is inherently problematic because the kinds or content of Justice
that is called for will vary tremendously based upon whose Justice is being ex-
ecuted. For instance, survivors of genocide may not, and likely will not, have
synonymous notions of Justice, and by extension prefer the same legal prescrip-
tions, as interveners from a completely different cultural context. Moreover, it
is mistaken to assume that either the survivors or the interveners are monolithic
groups ready to rally around a common conception of Justice and associated
legal scheme. Patterson is silent on which species of Justice should be chosen
when there are conflicts-as there almost certainly will be-between and even
within groups like these.
These issues are instantiated in a particular example that Patterson ex-
plores in his work: the quest for Justice in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan
genocide (pp. 87-93). Ultimately domestic and foreign policymakers chose to
implement very different legal prescriptions: the Gacaca Court system and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) respectively. The Gacaca
Court system emerged in the wake of the Rwandan genocide as an alternative
to traditional criminal trials; the fledgling government in Rwanda was simply
unable to try the tens of thousands of people implicated in the atrocities. These
courts were based on traditional, communally enforced law and overseen by
locally appointed community leaders or elders. Even though the Gacaca Courts
have prioritized Order over Justice by expediting the trial process, they have
come under criticism of major international watchdogs such as Human Rights
Watch. These organizations worry that the trials are unfair because the accused
are tried without the benefit of lawyers, and that potential witnesses remain
open to the threat of violence. The results of these trials have not yet passed in-
to the realm of history, and therefore it is unclear whether these criticisms of
Justice will eventually have a bearing on Order.
The Gacaca Court system, intimate, traditional, communally enforced,
stands in stark contrast to the other method of seeking Justice employed in the
wake of the genocide-the ICTR. The ICTR was established by the United Na-
tions Security Council and is located not in Rwanda, but across the border in
Tanzania. The court's judges come from around the world. So far, the ICTR
has indicted only 95 individuals and finished proceedings against 31. While the
ICTR is more likely to escape certain criticisms of the international community,
the trials have been lengthy, expensive, and remote, far from the sightline of
those who were wronged.
The concept of Justice demands its content to be meaningful. Even
Rwanda's case, a relative success, raises important questions about how Justice
should be administered and facilitated in cases in which the international com-
munity has intervened. Whose Justice will prevail? Are crimes properly viewed
as transgressions against a particular community (the Hutus), or as crimes
against humanity? Patterson tells us that Justice both depends upon and sup-
ports Order, but in the difficult case of intervention-the very case he is trying
to address in his book-we are not given a metric for that Justice. The policy-
maker, deciding in the moment on one option over another, cannot know
whether his choice of kilograms will be delegitimized when, in two genera-
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tions, the progeny of those who have been held to that measure protest that it
should have been conducted in pounds.
Patterson's discussion of Conciliation, like his analysis of Justice, is also
incomplete. The ultimate sign that a war has ended well is a conciliatory ges-
ture performed on behalf of a sovereign party. But, for reasons addressed be-
low, the significance of such a gesture becomes complicated when third parties
intervene and have stakes in the conflict. According to Patterson, in cases of
intrastate conflict, conciliation might take the form of amnesty and truth com-
missions. In an international conflict, the parties must show "costly, novel, vo-
luntary and irrevocable signals" of good will and willingness to negotiate (p.
117). Conciliation is rare because it is an innovative act, one that may help to
sustain peace and sovereignty, but is not necessary to do so. It is generous, ref-
lective, and idealistic.
If conciliation is the true measure of a war ended well, what should be
the role of a third party to a conflict that may have helped resolve it? If conci-
liatory actions gain their power and legitimacy from the sincerity of their per-
formance, are they compromised by the presence of a third party agenda? Nu-
merous ceasefires were signed by Israelis and Arabs in cities around the world
as third parties played mediator, yet their conflict remains unresolved to this
day. Patterson properly points to Conciliation as the ultimate mark of success,
but makes no recommendations for how third parties intervening in compli-
cated, protracted conflicts can reliably ensure that Conciliation is genuinely
achieved.
Despite these problems, or perhaps in part because of them, Patterson's
task is extremely ambitious. To his credit, he does not pretend to have all the
answers. Like Bruce Ackerman at the end of his article The Emergency Consti-
tution,14 Patterson invites scholars to expand upon his ideas. Academics should
accept this request; Patterson's model might fail to give precise prescriptions to
policymakers, but he has unearthed something immensely valuable: the long-
forgotten Machiavellian notion that Order is the key to any effective post-war
transition. By exhuming this idea, skillfully adapting it to the present day, and
emphasizing how Justice and Conciliation can and must serve Order, Patterson
has set the stage for an intellectual revolution. If that revolution spreads from
the ivory towers of academia to the realm of policy, the ramifications could be
significant indeed.
In particular, this intellectual revolution could manifest itself by shifting
American foreign policy from its idealistic, liberalizing Wilsonian focus toward
a more humble, Jacksonian aim, interested in achieving political objectives
without refashioning nations in America's self-image. Since the Second World
War, the United States has fought to spread capitalism and liberal democracy
throughout the world. It has sought to do this directly through regime change
and indirectly by pragmatically supporting the illiberal enemies of its ideologi-
cal foes. The former often failed when the United States initiated economic and
political liberalization at the expense of establishing Order; the latter often re-
14. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1091 (2004).
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suited in the proliferation of disorder that in turn fueled the rise of extremist so-
cial movements like the Taliban. Despite this problematic history, our last two
presidents have embraced this Wilsonian tradition, consistently championing
war-induced transitions to liberal democracy and allying themselves with illi-
beral groups and regimes with whom they share a common enemy. Perhaps the
next president, armed with the fruits of Patterson's labor, and recognizing the
immense danger of disregarding Order and propagating disorder, will institute a
more Jacksonian foreign policy instead.
Economic Foundations of International Law. By Eric A. Posner & Alan 0.
Sykes. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2013. Pp. 2, 372. Price: $65.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Jayoung Jeon & Tanya Kapoor.
Self-interest and cooperation rarely go hand in hand. Yet both terms
frame Eric Posner and Alan Sykes's arguments in Economic Foundations of
International Law. In their book, Posner and Sykes apply economics to interna-
tional law based on the premise that states are "self-interested agents" that use
international law to obtain the benefits of international cooperation: "[E]ach
state that becomes party to an agreement must perceive itself better off than by
refusing to participate" (p.21), and "[s]tates enter into treaties and remain in
them only when doing so advances their interests. . . . States pay their debts be-
cause if they did not, they would be shut out of the credit market in the future"
(p. 49). According to the authors, international agreements are like contracts:
negotiated and designed for efficient breach, but usually not enforced by third
parties with coercive powers (pp. 24-27). Here, Posner and Sykes state a strik-
ing claim: Many international agreements are self-enforcing (p. 27). Unlike
contracts, which are legally enforceable, international law has no exogenous
enforcement mechanism (p. 27). No global police force exists to enforce inter-
national agreements; states that defect from agreements face few legal costs.
Although the authors fully support their assertion that international law is
self-enforcing, their economic analysis falls short. In applying game theory to
enforcement, Posner and Sykes focus solely on interactions between two par-
ties: if one nation defects in a bilateral agreement, the other can retaliate, and
vice versa (pp. 27-30). Thus, Posner and Sykes do not extend their analysis to
multilateral agreements, which take place far more frequently than do bilateral
agreements.
More seriously, however, the authors fail to clarify how different eco-
nomic principles can work together to strengthen or weaken nations' incentives
to enforce agreements; instead, economic principles and concepts are analyzed
separately. Concepts such as transaction costs, arbitration, and hegemony-
richly discussed in the first half of the book-are not explicitly synthesized in
later parts of the book. Thus, the reader is left to grapple with several questions
that seemingly conflict with the authors' principles: Why are certain multilater-
al agreements still enforced if they do not fit within the authors' framework?
Why do hegemonic powers enforce agreements or engage in sanctions even if
doing so increases free ridership? Can Posner and Sykes's economic principles
work in tandem with each other to increase nations' incentives to enforce inter-
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national law?
Interested readers can conceivably discover answers through their own
synthesis of the material presented. In the first half of the book, Posner and
Sykes present economic principles, most of which illustrate the difficulties of
enforcing multilateral agreements. Yet for the remainder of the book, the au-
thors present examples that seemingly contradict the principles that they deli-
neated earlier in the book. For example, the authors discuss the depletion of the
ozone layer, a classic collective action problem, and its successful resolution
through a multilateral treaty, the Montreal Protocol (pp. 229-30). To enforce
the treaty, developed nations paid off developing nations, facilitating access to
ozone-friendly technologies and thus avoiding breach (p. 229). Interestingly,
earlier in the book, the authors briefly discuss side payments-often given by
one nation to another to facilitate negotiation-but never fully explain how side
payments could be employed to strengthen enforcement (p. 21). Therefore,
Posner and Sykes are adept at describing what may result under default rules in
economics, but are not forthcoming on how policies have been shaped, or on
how economics can be used to create more binding international law. The un-
connected discussion leaves readers trying to deduce how to apply Posner and
Sykes's framework in practice.
Posner and Sykes's focus on theory also leaves readers confused as to
how their framework would apply to or explain recent international develop-
ments. For example, the authors do not explain why certain countries tend to
enforce agreements or intervene militarily despite the potential to encourage
free-riding. Posner and Sykes only devote a short passage to these concerns,
and in their study, they only analyze what could happen if a hegemonic power
were to enforce international law (p. 186). Moreover, if free-riding were an is-
sue, countries that are not directly involved in the conflict would reasonably be
in favor of, or neutral toward, military interventions; a country could benefit
from other countries' military intervention, without expending any of its own
resources. History, however, shows that countries' responses to military inter-
vention in other countries have not been uniform. For example, in August 1992,
the United Kingdom and France did not favor NATO's large-scale military in-
tervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.1s On the other hand, the United States fa-
vored the intervention even though non-NATO member nations would free ride
from its actions.' 6 The authors do not posit convincing explanations, economic
or otherwise, that could account for such different responses.
Other scholarly work offers stronger explanations for the division. For
example, one account suggests that the United States's desire to remain a glob-
al power prompted it to favor intervention. In other words, the United States
might be willing to bear the cost of free-riding because it receives significant
benefits from maintaining its hegemony. Although Posner and Sykes mention
15. SONIA LUCARELLI, EUROPE AND THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA: A POLITICAL FAILURE IN
SEARCH OF A SCHOLARLY EXPLANATION 36 (2000).
16. Id.
17. DAVID N. GIBBS, FIRST Do No HARM: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 16 (2009).
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cost-benefit analysis, they do not make explicit that the cost of free-riding is not
constant across all nations, nor do they explain how their cost-benefit analysis
interacts with the unique circumstances of different nations.
Posner and Sykes write in a manner that is accessible even to those who
do not have backgrounds in economics or international law. This makes Eco-
nomic Foundations of International Law a useful guide to both law students
and scholars, the book's intended audience (p. 3). Perhaps the insufficient ela-
boration of how the economic principles they expound explain international le-
gal behavior arises because Posner and Sykes aim for "breadth, not depth" in
their book (p. 4). The book, which is structured like a textbook, inherently
lacks sufficient leeway to explore certain examples in depth.
However, for those students or scholars who wish to analyze or suggest
policy changes, the book is informative, though not thorough. Posner and Sykes
demonstrate how international law can be structured, but only in terms of sin-
gular economic principles and concepts. They do not explain how a synthesis
of various economic principles can shape international law. Because the au-
thors discuss and analyze economic principles separately, the book is unable to
fully explain recent events in international law. The book also fails to elucidate
how and why nations have enforced multilateral agreements. And the book re-
mains silent on what seems to be a central principle of law and economics: how
incentives can be shifted in favor of or against enforcing international law.
War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics. By Emile
Simpson. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 1, 285.
Price: $32.50 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Megan Braun.
In April 1975, as American officials made a last-ditch effort to negotiate
an end to the ill-fated Vietnam War, U.S. army officer Colonel Harry Summers
told his North Vietnamese counterpart Colonel Tu, "You never beat us on the
battlefield" (p. 36). Tu replied, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant" (Id.).
Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese the following week. This episode illu-
strates the great irony of modem warfare: it is possible to win militarily but still
lose the war. In War From the Ground Up, Emile Simpson describes how this
perverse logic has "totally unhinge[d] strategic theory," and attempts to revital-
ize the field by offering a new paradigm for thinking about twenty-first century
conflicts (p. 138).
Simpson, a former infantry officer in Britain's elite Royal Gurkha Rifles,
draws on his experiences in Afghanistan to argue that modern conflicts sharply
depart from traditional conceptualizations of warfare and represent a more
overtly political form of conflict. Carl von Clausewitz, widely credited as the
father of classical military strategy, argued that although war's function is to
provide a military victory that establishes the conditions for a political solution,
war itself is apolitical. In his famous tome, On War, Clausewitz writes, "The
political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never
18. Id. at 4.
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be considered in isolation from their purpose."' 9 Although the political objec-
tives might vary in war, military victory is the means for achieving those objec-
tives.20 Up until the end of the Second World War, this was largely true. How-
ever, after 1945, insurgencies replaced interstate war as the dominant mode of
conflict and, as in the Vietnam anecdote above, military victory ceased to be
synonymous with political success.21
Beginning with the Malayan Emergency in 1948, Western powers increa-
singly found themselves drawn into counterinsurgency wars where the objec-
tives were more focused on political exchange than military victory. Simpson
calls these conflicts armed politics. While traditional wars had sought to
achieve a military victory that would serve as a basis for realizing other politi-
cal goals, in the Vietnam War, and in the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afg-
hanistan, "armed force was used as a direct extension of political activity out-
side of war" (p. 63). In each of these conflicts, the United States sought to repel
one particular political ideology, be it communism, authoritarianism or Islamic
fundamentalism, and establish a democratic goverment to its liking. What is
the difference between setting the conditions for a political solution and direct-
ly effecting political outcomes? Simpson argues that in the latter "armed forces
are required to have effect in an environment in which actors use an eclectic
range of means, violent and nonviolent, to compete vis-A-vis one another for
political advantage" rather than military advantage (p. 102).
Importantly, Simpson's argument is not a complete departure from Clau-
sewitz's theory of war; rather, it attempts to build on it by focusing on an area
of conflict on which On War is largely silent. Clausewitz understood that war
was a spectrum marked by total war on one extreme and limited wars on the
other. While total wars are fought to achieve complete military victory, limited
wars are fought for a restricted set of political ends. As Clausewitz notes, li-
mited wars are not merely less intense, they also exhibit a strong tension be-
tween the desired "political directives" and the "military's natural tendency to-
wards violence." 22 In these circumstances, Clausewitz argues, "war will be
driven further from its natural course . .. and the conflict will seem increasing-
ly political in character."23 Despite this prescient observation, which seems to
anticipate the emergence of armed politics, On War's primary focus is on total
war. Simpson's contribution is to identify the shift towards the other end of the
spectrum, and to offer a new theoretical framework that explains how armed
politics is different from total war, and how it ought to be conducted.
The corollary to Simpson's claim that modem conflicts are a direct exten-
sion of political activity is the observation that the array of parties has become
much more complex. Total wars have traditionally been bipolar conflicts where
the parties to the conflict are either allies or enemies. However, in armed poli-
19. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Pare eds. & trans., Prince-
ton Univ. Press 1989) (1832).
20. See id. at 647.
21. See Thomas X. Hammes, Why Study Small Wars?, 1 SMALL WARS J. 1, 2 (2005).




tics, force is intended to influence a much wider array of audiences. The war in
Afghanistan, for example, is not a polarized battle with the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afg-
hanistan (GIROA) on one side, and the Taliban on the other. Rather, it is a
fragmented conflict with a multitude of parties. GIROA and ISAF also fight
against the Haqqani network, Hizbi-i-Islami Gulbuddin and al-Qaeda. Like the
Taliban, each of these groups is an internally divided organization that encom-
passes a variety of self-interested groups (p. 75). To complicate matters further,
all of these parties vie for the support of a diverse and "politically kaleidoscop-
ic" Afghan society (p. 88). Therefore, ISAF combat patrols aim both to ferret
out insurgents and to safeguard the local population. They are intended to build
public trust in ISAF and GIROA forces and undermine the Taliban's political
influence. In light of this dual purpose, military activity is often indistinguisha-
ble from political activity and the simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic and mili-
tary means establishes a condition that is "neither war nor peace" (p. 2).
Ultimately Simpson vindicates Clausewitzian strategy by arguing that
modem conflicts do not invalidate principles of conventional warfare; they
simply need to be analyzed in a separate paradigm. He writes, "[t]he irony to-
day is that we blame the failure of the Clausewitzian inter-state paradigm on
the mechanism itself rather than on the contemporary circumstances in which it
is used" (p. 234). It is a persuasive argument and has garnered lavish praise
from strategists. The great military historian Michael Howard has said that
Simpson's work should be "compulsory reading at every level in the military"
and "deserves to be seen as a coda to Clausewitz's On War."24
However, the import of Simpson's argument extends beyond military
strategy. The fundamental transformation of armed conflict that he identifies
also undermines core principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This
body of law, which is rooted primarily in the Geneva Conventions, the Hague
Conventions, subsequent treaties and customary international law, is intended
to regulate armed conflict.2 5 Properly applied, IHL acts as a constraint on mili-
tary strategy, limiting the weapons and actions that are available to belligerents
and prescribing the responsibilities owed to civilians, as well as fellow bellige-
rents. However, the relationship between strategy and law is not one-sided.
Strategic principles also inform the construction of international law, by pro-
viding terminology as well as a set of assumptions about how conflicts func-
tion. Thus the new forms of conflict that are transforming strategic theory also
influence the foundations of IHL. And as recent conflicts illustrate, distinction
and proportionality, two of the fundamental principles for regulating the con-
duct of war, are both undermined by the armed-politics approach.
Alluding to the principle of distinction, which requires belligerents to dis-
tinguish between civilians and combatants, Simpson points to the disconnect
24. Michael Howard, Narratives of War, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (April 3, 2013),
http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/articlel239841.ece.
25. See FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF
wAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3-4 (4th ed. 2011).
26. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
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between modem conflicts and IHL: "[I]ntemational law is constructed on the
basis that one can define specific 'military' targets. Yet the idea that one can
distinguish between 'military' and 'political' targets, when strategy uses force
directly for political effect, is problematic" (p. 235). This claim finds support in
a recent study by Janina Dill, which argues that during the 2003 Iraq War the
objectives pursued with U.S. air power were "primarily political rather than
military in nature."27 Dill observes that in the initial weeks of the operation, air
strikes were not confined to military targets but also targeted ten media installa-
tions, fifty-two regime leaders, and power generation and distribution facili-
ties.28 According to Dill, the United States attempted to legitimate the validity
of these targets under international law on "the basis of the contribution their
destruction or neutralization makes toward achieving the war's political ends."
29 However, this rationalization demonstrates that political ends have become
incorporated into decisions about what qualifies as a civilian target.30 Thus,
armed politics introduces slippage into the definitions of civilian and combatant
targets that underpin the principle of distinction.
The fusion of political and military objectives also undermines the law of
proportionality, which incorporates the strategic objective of military advan-
tage. According to the law of proportionality, the collateral damage caused by a
use of force cannot be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advan-
tage.3 1 The meaning of military advantage is perhaps the most complicated
component of the definition of roportionality and it is widely understood to be
a matter of military judgment. This is because the level of military advantage
in any given operation depends on the strategic objectives that are defined and
pursued by the military. Thus assessing military advantage is primarily a
question of strategy, not law. In a conventional conflict between two polarized
parties, military advantage describes the contribution that a particular act of
force will make towards achieving the larger strategic objective: military victo-
ry. In the context of 'armed politics,' when military means are being employed
to pursue political objectives, rather than simply victory, military advantage as
traditionally understood becomes an anachronism.
Perhaps the concept of military advantage can be refashioned to calculate
the relationship between the use of force and an operation's political objectives;
however, this is unlikely for two reasons. First, as Clausewitz noted in his criti-
que of limited war, political objectives and military means often work at cross-
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
27. Janina Dill, The Influence of Law on U.S. Air Targeting Practices in the Two Gulf Wars
22 (Jan. 29, 2009) (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University) (on file with Bodelian Library, Ox-
ford University), available at http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME09/Dill09.pdf.
28. Id. at 21.
29. JANINA DILL, LEGITIMATE TARGETS? SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
US BOMBING (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at ch. 6, § 6.2) (on file with author).
30. Id.
31. Protocol I, supra note 26, art. 51(5)(b).
32. Henry Shue, Proportionality in War, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WAR 1755 (Gordon Martel
ed., 2012).
33. Id. at 1760.
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purposes. (Consider, for example, a drone strike that has the beneficial military
effect of killing two suspected militants but the detrimental political effect of
inciting anti-American sentiment and increasing political support for the Tali-
ban.) Second, although military advantage has always proven difficult to quan-
tify, calculating political advantage is considerably more challenging. The rela-
tionship between destroying a bridge that is necessary for an enemy to maintain
his supply lines is a precise goal with a clear relationship to military victory.
Political objectives tend to be less concrete; the connection between military
action and the achievement of these goals is often unclear and it is difficult to
say when a goal such as winning the hearts and minds of an Afghan village has
actually been accomplished. This indeterminacy is not merely a problem for
those attempting to craft a coherent military strategy; it also makes it nearly
impossible for the principle of proportionality to determine the appropriate bal-
ance between civilian harm and military and/or political advantage. This prob-
lem is an apt illustration of Simpson's finding that "Clausewitzian paradigms of
war stop working when they cannot invest the use of armed force with military
significance" (p. 74).
The United States has consistently claimed that conflicts such as the on-
going counterinsurgency in Afghanistan can conform to traditional conceptions
of international law, and it has attempted to adapt the principles of proportio-
nality and discrimination to armed politics. However, some scholars have ar-
gued that from the perspective of international law, the entire premise of armed
politics is inherently flawed. The IHL principle of military necessity, which
was introduced in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, established that "[t]he
only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war
is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." 34 A strict interpretation of this
principle would lead to the following conclusion: "If one has a political goal
that one cannot achieve by means of a military victory gained in compliance
with the St. Petersburg assumption, one simply has no permissible way of pur-
suing this goal with the use of military force."35 If this line of reasoning is ap-
plied to the principles of distinction and proportionality, it suggests that the on-
ly legitimate targets are those which are directly related to defeating the enemy
(i.e., not political targets) and the proportionality calculus should afford no
weight to the pursuit of political advantage because only those operations that
directly advance the objective of military victory are acceptable.
Military practitioners and strategists will actively debate Simpson's bold
claim that there has been a tectonic shift in the defining attributes of modem
armed conflict. However disciples of IHL should also take note. Strategic
thought and IHL are deeply intertwined and the transition towards armed poli-
tics has the potential to undermine, or at the very least distort, key propositions
regulating the conduct of armed conflicts.
34. Declaration of St. Petersburg, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in CONVENTIONS
AND DECLARATIONS BETWEEN THE POWERS CONCERNING WAR, ARBITRATION AND NEUTRALITY 6
(1915).
35. Janina Dill & Henry Shue, Limiting the Killing in War: Military Necessity and the St. Pe-
tersburg Assumption, 26 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 311, 327 (2012).
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The Future of International Law: Global Government. By Joel P. Trachtman.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xi, 302. Price:
$99.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Albert Pak.
Sometimes the law stands in the way of getting what we want. Or it de-
mands that we do things that seem pointless, useless, or random. At worst, law
requires us to participate in what we believe is bad public policy. It is tempting
in such situations to disregard the law, particularly when we are so strongly op-
posed to the law that we would rather break it than avoid punishment.
So, too, is the case with nations and international law. International law
can be just as cumbersome, annoying, and seemingly counterproductive to na-
tions as domestic law can be to individuals. And in certain situations, nations
will believe that they are better off breaking international law, and thereby risk-
ing sanctions, than following it.
What, then, do nations do? What, then, do we do?
With people, it seems we sometimes follow the law even when we find
the law inconvenient and the risk of punishment low. Indeed that is precisely
what we require of one another when we make law. We require ourselves to
follow the law, period-not just when we find the law convenient.
Do nations similarly oblige one another? Will they?
Joel Trachtman's answer in The Future of International Law: Global
Government might seem to be in the affirmative. After all, he predicts a world
that will be increasingly governed by international law. He argues that globali-
zation, technological growth, and democratization will "increase the scope and
magnitude of international externalities and public goods." The world will be-
come more interconnected, and more and more, public goods and externalities
will be spread over multiple nations, such that their optimal regulation will re-
quire international effort-and international law (p. 292). The growth of inter-
national law, then, will not be planned, but will occur "bottom-up," where na-
tions demand it (p. 291). This is because "[a]utonomous, sovereign states
would be expected to enter into international law as an exercise of their efforts
to maximize the achievement of their preferences" (p. 64).
Trachtman enriches his argument with illustrative models and case stu-
dies. For example, he develops a two-level game-theoretic model to specify just
how new opportunities to join international agreements will affect key players
in domestic politics (pp. 58-63, 141-44). He also examines specific areas of in-
ternational law-including cybersecurity, human rights, and public health-
with impressive sensitivity to detail. These case studies lead Trachtman to a
further insight. As international law grows to meet nations' needs, "some of
these needs will necessitate fortification of the power of international law" (p.
2). This is true especially, according to Trachtman, in global warming, where
the incentive is great to defect from the established rule. In such situations,
general compliance will require "significant punishments for failure to comply"
(p. 165).
That last move shows just how much Trachtman's conception of interna-
tional law focuses on traditional interests and incentives. He thinks that the in-
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creasingly international externalities will spur the growth of international law
precisely because the externalities will incentivize nations to create more inter-
national law. And he thinks that international law will be fortified with greater
incentives because such fortification itself is in the nations' best interests-in
being able to credibly commit to, and reasonably expect others' compliance
with, international law.
But what about our standing question? Will nations simply view interna-
tional law as a system of incentives and penalties that tend to incentivize com-
pliance but also leave nations free to choose to pay the penalties rather than fol-
low the law? Or will nations, like people, go further and oblige one another to
follow law even when the costs of compliance outweigh the costs of sanctions?
H.L.A. Hart, writing in 1961, remarked that basic legal concepts cannot
be understood without reference to the legal subjects.'internal point of view.' 36
Where there is law, its subjects go beyond simply recognizing that there are
punishments backing the law. They treat the law "as guides to the conduct of
social life, as the basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punish-
ment . . . ."37 It is not just that an expectation of punishment is attached to vi-
olations of law; rather, a violation of law is seen by society as the just reason
for punishment. That is the sense in which laws bind us.
There is, then, a moral dimension to law. Laws in general create com-
pliance obligations.39 That is what we require of one another, and that is what
generally overrides our temptations to break the law. Without this moral di-
mension, there is no law; there is simply an agreement to change the landscape
of incentives in a particular way.
Harold Koh has demonstrated that international law already displays this
moral dimension.40 In 1985, the United States considered developing a missile
defense system that amounted to a violation of the 1972 bilateral Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To avoid such a
violation, the United States proposed to reinterpret the treaty to allow for the
desired missile system. This proposal instigated a national debate about wheth-
er or not to stick to the original interpretation of the treaty. In the end, the rein-
terpretation prevailed in 1985, only to be jettisoned in 1993 in favor of the orig-
inal interpretation. Koh points out that, presumably, the United States' balance
of incentives in developing the missile system did not change between 1985
and 1993.41 What led to the return to the original interpretation was key poli-
36. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 98 (3d ed. 2012).
37. Id. at 90.
38. Hart goes on to further specify what constitutes law. In addition to the internal acceptance,
there needs to be a rule of recognition by which laws are recognized to be laws. It is this rule of recogni-
tion that gives legitimacy to the law and therefore commands internal acceptance. See id. at 91-99.
39. The point here is general. I do not mean to address the difficult question of whether or not
even immoral laws create compliance obligations.
40. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2645-46 (1997) (book review). In Koh's terms, the internalization of norms is what separates mere com-
pliance from obedience. For Hart, this internal acceptance is constitutive of law. But for Koh, it seems,
the internal acceptance distinguishes differing attitudes one might adopt towards law. See id. at 2599
(asking not whether international norms are law, but why nations obey (or disobey) international law).
41. Id. at 2648.
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cymakers' internal acceptance of it. Koh concludes that the return marked not a
reflection of incentives, but rather the acceptance of law as binding.4 2
Thus full-fledged law necessarily involves a moral component, and there
is reason to think that morality is already embedded in international law. But
where is this moral component of law in Trachtman's vision of the future of in-
ternational law?
It is largely missing, or at best relegated to the sidelines. Perhaps Trach-
tman's view is that moral obligations are epiphenomenal to the changing land-
scape of incentives, such that increasing demand for international law gives rise
to its internal acceptance as morally binding. But can expediency really be said
to give rise to norms? Can a relationship consisting solely of the pursuit of utili-
ty-maximization inspire obligations?
More likely, the internal acceptance of law is a distinct phenomenon, sep-
arate from changing incentives. If that is correct, then internal acceptance of
law is not simply reflective of incentives to comply with the law, but rather ge-
nerative-of norms, obligations, and further incentives. This thought raises
pressing questions. How did internal acceptance of domestic law develop? Will
internal acceptance develop differently in international law? Once it is present,
how will it fuel further growth of law?
With respect to these questions, Trachtman's pronouncement of the future
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